Europe is slowly following the side of the American China hawks | Popgen Tech

The United States and the European Union have struggled for years to see eye to eye with China, but that is slowly, if unevenly, changing as more European leaders sound alarm bells about the West’s over-reliance on Chinese technologies and investments and a growing geopolitical rivalry with Beijing.

For several years, EU leaders have chafed at the hawkish attitude adopted by most of Washington when it comes to Beijing and quietly rolled their eyes at some of the most staunchly anti-China lawmakers in the United States who have advocated for ‘ a complete economic disengagement from Beijing. Now the China hawks are gaining a foothold in Brussels and other European capitals, spurred on by Beijing’s coercive economic practices, the threats of spyware embedded in its technology, and the grim new sense of vulnerability to geopolitical tensions fueled by Russia’s incursion the Ukraine is caused. .

In Western Europe, the Netherlands is mulling a plan to join US export restrictions on Chinese semiconductors, Germany has blocked a series of high-profile Chinese technology investments, and Belgium is investigating Chinese investments in its port infrastructure. To the east, smaller EU powers are strengthening ties with Taiwan despite sharp pushback from Beijing, and the Baltic states have helped sponsor China’s efforts to make trade inroads in the region.

The United States and the European Union have struggled for years to see eye to eye with China, but that is slowly, if unevenly, changing as more European leaders sound alarm bells about the West’s over-reliance on Chinese technologies and investments and a growing geopolitical rivalry with Beijing.

For several years, EU leaders have chafed at the hawkish attitude adopted by most of Washington when it comes to Beijing and quietly rolled their eyes at some of the most staunchly anti-China lawmakers in the United States who have advocated for ‘ a complete economic disengagement from Beijing. Now the China hawks are gaining a foothold in Brussels and other European capitals, spurred on by Beijing’s coercive economic practices, the threats of spyware embedded in its technology, and the grim new sense of vulnerability to geopolitical tensions fueled by Russia’s incursion the Ukraine is caused. .

In Western Europe, the Netherlands is mulling a plan to join US export restrictions on Chinese semiconductors, Germany has blocked a series of high-profile Chinese technology investments, and Belgium is investigating Chinese investments in its port infrastructure. To the east, smaller EU powers are strengthening ties with Taiwan despite sharp pushback from Beijing, and the Baltic states have helped sponsor China’s efforts to make trade inroads in the region.

“Europe is finally getting it through its head that yes, we need to think more strategically about long-term investment from China, but for our own good and not just begrudgingly plodding along with what Washington is doing,” said one senior European diplomat, who speaking of anonymity. “There is still a big difference between how the Europeans and the US view China, but Europe’s game of catch-up is accelerating.”

That emerging sentiment is being welcomed with open arms in Washington, where officials under both the former Trump and current Biden administrations have regularly issued warnings about the geopolitical and intelligence vulnerabilities of Chinese telecom firms building Europe’s 5G infrastructure or taking majority stakes in major European ports. take. .

“Over the last five years the relationship with China has changed dramatically, really dramatically,” Margrethe Vestager, the EU’s top competition commissioner, tell Foreign policy earlier this month.

The slow sea change in Brussels could go a long way in easing underlying tensions between Washington and its European allies at a perilous moment in transatlantic relations, when both sides are struggling to help Ukraine fight a massive Russian invasion and China is seeking its geopolitical and economic expanding influence on the world stage.

Europe could also face renewed pressure from Capitol Hill next year to harden its stance on China as Republicans take over the House of Representatives and pressure the Biden administration and US allies to do more to confront China’s protectionist trade practices and vast control of global supply chains.

So far, Beijing hasn’t had much luck convincing Europe that Washington’s warnings are overheated — and it may have Russia to thank for that. Russia’s war in Ukraine has served as a stark wake-up call to the EU that it is ill-equipped to manage a major war on its doorstep and far too dependent on Russia for its energy needs, officials and experts said. As Europe scrambles to wean itself off Russian oil and gas, new questions are emerging about the vulnerability of its critical infrastructure and supply chains, particularly semiconductors and chips, port facilities, 5G networks and other key parts of the economy increasingly in Chinese hands. .

As the war in Ukraine enters its tenth month and the death toll from Russia’s invasion mounts, China has also backed Russia diplomatically at the United Nations and sought to expand trade ties in a way that offers economic lifelines to Moscow’s controversial and embattled sanctioned economy, trends that are likely to drive European capitals further away from Beijing.

“What might finally help Europe wake up to the China threat is Beijing helping Moscow and giving it more diplomatic cover to wage the war,” the senior European diplomat said. The diplomat said that Eastern European member states, which see Russia’s incursion as more of an existential threat than their western neighbors, may be waking up to the China threat faster than Western Europe.

However, there are still some signs of a shift. The Netherlands is reported to have agreed in principle to join US export controls on Chinese semiconductors, although no official announcement has been made and the country’s foreign trade minister Liesje Schreinemacher said in November that it would not copy the US measures one-for-one. The United Kingdom and Germany have in recent months blocked Chinese companies from purchasing semiconductor manufacturing facilities on their soil, citing national security concerns.

And while there is increasing alignment between Europe and the United States on China, further escalation by the Biden administration could raise questions about how far Western allies will be willing to go in additional disengagement efforts.

That shouldn’t stop Washington from moving unilaterally, said Nazak Nikakhtar, who was undersecretary for industry and security at the Commerce Department during the Trump administration. Nikakhtar has been heavily involved in the Trump administration’s efforts to crack down on Chinese telecommunications company Huawei, and the pressure it has successfully put on European allies to ensure they sign up.

“Europe was of course in different places about the threat, but we moved unilaterally; we had those conversations and they moved in their own way,” Nikakhtar said. “So they didn’t do export controls like we told them to do… they started using their own internal legal regulatory mechanisms to do that.”

Still, progress on the European side has been too slow and uneven in the eyes of some US policymakers who are impatient to have European allies fully on board with their hawkish approach to China.

When German Chancellor Olaf Scholz visited Beijing last month to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping, he arrived with a delegation of German trade and business leaders in tow, angering some lawmakers in both the EU and Washington with his message that Europe is still open to Chinese business. EU countries, struggling with inflation and the energy crisis caused by Russia’s war in Ukraine, may boost trade with China to ease their economic pain.

Most, but not all, EU members have set up mechanisms to screen foreign direct investment for potential national security vulnerabilities in view of Chinese investment in Europe’s critical infrastructure. And as cautious as Europe has grown, it hasn’t gone completely hawkish.

“I don’t think Europe has such a strong idea of ​​the geopolitical conflict with China as the US,” said Xiaomeng Lu, director of geotechnology at Eurasia Group. “Europe still believes that a trade relationship with China is good, and the postural geopolitical dynamic with China is less adversarial between [the] EU and China compared to the tension between the US and China.”

Some of this makes sense, say the EU’s defenders. After all, the Biden administration has to coordinate its China message across just one government, while the EU has to coordinate across more than two dozen countries.

“China is a unifying element across the political spectrum in the US,” said Stefano Sannino, the EU’s number two diplomat. Foreign policy in a recent interview. “In Europe, we are 27 member states that have different sensitivities. We also need to bring all these countries on the same line. And that’s the work we’re trying to do.”

Sannino insisted that the United States and the EU largely see eye to eye on China. “I think in terms of assessment, of vision, of what are the challenges, the threats, we have no difference,” he said.

The debate comes against the backdrop of a new campaign by the United States to bring back critical infrastructure, such as semiconductor and chip manufacturing, that US policymakers say has been outsourced to China for too long. A core component of this strategy involves bringing the production and manufacturing of critical infrastructure to American soil, or at least the soil of American allies. Experts say the United States must move in step with the EU on export controls and trade restrictions to relocate critical supply chains because of how interconnected the global economy is. Relocating chip production, for example, is going to be much easier if Washington can coordinate its plans with Europe.

“Global export control has become a team sport,” said Courtney McCaffrey, a geopolitical analyst at EY, the global consulting firm formerly known as Ernst & Young. “The global economy is so interconnected that the most effective way for the US to achieve its policy goals is with multilateral coordination.”

This has already led to opportunities for the EU to boost its own industrial base, with major multibillion dollar investments from US chipmaker Intel in new chip factories in Italy and Germany. Yet US efforts to bring back critical supply chains have also fueled friction with the EU, particularly over a massive new US bill that throws billions of dollars in subsidies and tax breaks into green business and technologies such as renewable energy and electric vehicles.

Where things go from here depends on the power shift in Congress, the continuing impact of the war in Ukraine and growing tensions over Taiwan. But Washington is likely to continue to put the screws to China, regardless of whether Europe stands shoulder-to-shoulder.

“If you have a national security threat, move, address it,” Nikakhtar said. “Work on your allies, but give them the flexibility to move on their own time.”